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Agenda 2000 Where are we with Nuclear Waste Dinner debate
organised 04 December 2000, Brussels
Speaker : Prof. Dr. Ing Klaus Kühn, Technische Universität Clausthal, Director of Gesellschaft für Strahlenforschung - Institut für Tieflagerung (Institute for Underground Disposal) (Forschungszentrum für Umwelt und Gesundheit), presented the current status in Europe and the technical aspects of radioactive waste management. Prof. Kühn is a leading international expert on radioactive waste management. Commentary : Mikael Odenberg, (MP) member of the Swedish Parliament's Standing Committee on Energy, has a special interest in nuclear issues and will comment on the political situation in the sector. Both the political and technical aspects of radioactive waste management have been at the heart of the discussion. What are the partnerships required to acquire greater public acceptance? Why progress towards deep geological disposal has been greater in some countries than in others? What does the industry need to do in order to be able to implement its solutions and to obtain greater public acceptance? * * * Prof. Kühn was at pains to show that all the components of the management of radioactive waste had been developed and were implemented at the level of the industry in Europe, with one exception : the deep burial of highly radioactive wate and used fuel rods. In each of the member States in question, the decision is at an intermediary stage, ranging from investigation (BE, DE, DE, SW) to a postponed decision ( NL, SP, UK) and a decision « pending » ( FL). The problem of nuclear waste relates to its radioactive nature and in no way to its volume, since this is extremely small compared with other forms of industrial waste. The principle of the polluter pays applies to the management of radioactive waste, whether it comes from the nuclear industry or from other applications, either medical or industrial. The cost of the whole of the nuclear fuel cycle is approximately one hundredth of a euro per kWh (€ 0,01/kWh), which represents 20% of the full production cost of a nuclear kWh. The technologies applicable to the construction of storage places for highly active waste are available and the cost of their effective implementation is included in the cost of the cycle (€ 0,01kWh). The choice of sites for such storage places is more of a political than a technical problem which is linked to the public’s acceptance that such storage places are built. The way chemical and toxic waste has been stored for decades shows that this kind of problem can be solved practically provided that the political will is there. The discussion made it possible to make the point that, at present and for the foreseeable future, each country is responsible for storing the waste from its own installations. In the long term, it may be possible to envisage co-operation which would allow waste to be transferred from one country to another with a view to its final storage. However, the question might arise earlier for countries such as Lithuania and Slovenia who produce nuclear electricity and might be placed in a difficult situation because of their waste. Moreover, in the relatively short term, some countries might offer final storage sites on a commercial basis, e.g. Russia, although the Duma is currently refusing to accept this possibility. Mikael Odenberg, described the situation is his country by highlighting the following special features: right from the outset, it was agreed that used fuel would not be reprocessed elsewhere in order to keep control over the downstream part of the nuclear cycle in Sweden; moreover, the country is sparsely populated and has a substratum rich in hard rocks which are suitable for deep storage; responsibilities were clearly fixed from the outset, with the operators of nuclear plants being responsible for all of the problems, including those associated with waste management; there has never been a financing problem, since the operators have always levied a specific amount deducted from the retail price of the nuclear kWh, under the control of the government. The sum total of these deductions stands at 3 billion euro, of which 1.2 billion have already been used for waste management. Regardless of the position one adopts over the nuclear option for the future, the problem of nuclear waste must be addressed. And, according to Mikael Odenberg, it must be addressed on a voluntary basis. Feasibility studies in Sweden have been carried out on 8 sites, 2 or 3 of which will be selected with a view to in-depth investigations. A single site will then be chosen. Several local authorities are currently competing to be selected. The co-operation procedure at local level is a success and it is felt that this will have a knock-on effect at national level where the politicians are still on the defensive. The Swedish approach could provide a practical example for the idea of a « communication/consultation protocol between the industry and the public, or even between the nulcear State and the neighbouring non-nuclear State » mentioned during the debate and whose effect would be to rally public opinion in favour of accepting nuclear projects. The aim of the planned communication/consultation would be to show that the principle that « the benefit must be greater than the risk » has been properly taken into account. Prof. Kühn was at pains to show that all the components of the management of radioactive waste had been developed and were implemented at the level of the industry in Europe, with one exception : the deep burial of highly radioactive wate and used fuel rods. In each of the member States in question, the decision is at an intermediary stage, ranging from investigation (BE, DE, DE, SW) to a postponed decision ( NL, SP, UK) and a decision « pending » ( FL). The problem of nuclear waste relates to its radioactive nature and in no way to its volume, since this is extremely small compared with other forms of industrial waste. The principle of the polluter pays applies to the management of radioactive waste, whether it comes from the nuclear industry or from other applications, either medical or industrial. The cost of the whole of the nuclear fuel cycle is approximately one hundredth of a euro per kWh (€ 0,01/kWh), which represents 20% of the full production cost of a nuclear kWh. The technologies applicable to the construction of storage places for highly active waste are available and the cost of their effective implementation is included in the cost of the cycle (€ 0,01kWh). The choice of sites for such storage places is more of a political than a technical problem which is linked to the public’s acceptance that such storage places are built. The way chemical and toxic waste has been stored for decades shows that this kind of problem can be solved practically provided that the political will is there. The discussion made it possible to make the point that, at present and for the foreseeable future, each country is responsible for storing the waste from its own installations. In the long term, it may be possible to envisage co-operation which would allow waste to be transferred from one country to another with a view to its final storage. However, the question might arise earlier for countries such as Lithuania and Slovenia who produce nuclear electricity and might be placed in a difficult situation because of their waste. Moreover, in the relatively short term, some countries might offer final storage sites on a commercial basis, e.g. Russia, although the Duma is currently refusing to accept this possibility. Mikael Odenberg, described the situation is his country by highlighting the following special features: right from the outset, it was agreed that used fuel would not be reprocessed elsewhere in order to keep control over the downstream part of the nuclear cycle in Sweden; moreover, the country is sparsely populated and has a substratum rich in hard rocks which are suitable for deep storage; responsibilities were clearly fixed from the outset, with the operators of nuclear plants being responsible for all of the problems, including those associated with waste management; there has never been a financing problem, since the operators have always levied a specific amount deducted from the retail price of the nuclear kWh, under the control of the government. The sum total of these deductions stands at 3 billion euro, of which 1.2 billion have already been used for waste management. Regardless of the position one adopts over the nuclear option for the future, the problem of nuclear waste must be addressed. And, according to Mikael Odenberg, it must be addressed on a voluntary basis. Feasibility studies in Sweden have been carried out on 8 sites, 2 or 3 of which will be selected with a view to in-depth investigations. A single site will then be chosen. Several local authorities are currently competing to be selected. The co-operation procedure at local level is a success and it is felt that this will have a knock-on effect at national level where the politicians are still on the defensive. The Swedish approach could provide a practical example for the idea of a « communication/consultation protocol between the industry and the public, or even between the nulcear State and the neighbouring non-nuclear State » mentioned during the debate and whose effect would be to rally public opinion in favour of accepting nuclear projects. The aim of the planned communication/consultation would be to show that the principle that « the benefit must be greater than the risk » has been properly taken into account.
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